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Abstract. From 05.07 to 08.07.2009, the Dagstuhl Seminar 09282 Foun-
dations for Forgery-Resilient Cryptographic Hardware  was held in Schloss
Dagstuhl  Leibniz Center for Informatics. During the seminar, several
participants presented their current research, and ongoing work and open
problems were discussed. This paper provides a summary of the moti-
vation for the seminar and the importance of the research area, a list of
the participants and the program of talks given during the seminar.
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1 Motivation
The rapid expansion of global connectivity, distributed applications and digital
services over open networks and across organizational domains requires secure
IT systems that adhere to well-deﬁned policies. Cryptography and technical IT
security mechanisms support the establishment of secure channels and autho-
rized access. However, many of today's IT applications demand sophisticated
security and privacy mechanisms in both software and hardware that go beyond
secure channels and authorization and include truly secure liaisons: Enterprises
or manufacturers outsource their computations, data storage, and production
to potentially untrusted parties over which they have limited control. Medical
records are transmitted through and processed by various IT systems such as
Handhelds, PCs or hospital servers. Biometric data are carried by individuals
on their ID card or electronic passport. Fake and counterfeited pharmaceuti-
cals or automotive and avionic spare parts are packaged in some countries and
distributed illegally to worldwide destinations.
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IT system security is, however, not only based on strong cryptographic prim-
itives and protocols but also on technological support for secure implementation
of the corresponding algorithms. In particular, this concerns security function-
ality provided by the underlying hardware, which is commonly deployed in the
form of cryptographic hardware. The study of how to model, design, evaluate
and deploy such cryptographic hardware was the focus of our seminar.
The recent trend of deploying security functionality in hardware typically
assumes trust in the various parties involved in the design and manufacturing of
the hardware. The life-cycle of cryptographic hardware begins with the IC design
step, which results in IC blue-prints being shipped for production to (typically
overseas) low-cost manufacturer's facilities. This trend is driven by economic
and strategic reasons as well as by globalization. Although this model has many
advantages, it also has the disadvantage that it becomes much easier for attackers
to compromise hardware devices commonly used in critical infrastructure, which
includes commercial, health and defense applications.
As a result, today many ICs and components are overbuilt (over-produced
in an unauthorized manner). This, in turn, allows such devices and components
to enter the market through gray channels and erode the revenues of legitimate
Intellectual Property (IP) owners. In addition, there is a high risk that the func-
tionality on the chip is (deliberately) modiﬁed or supplemented with a hidden
trapdoor circuit, e.g., a hardware Trojan. For instance, keys which were never
supposed to leave a security chip might be leaked (e.g., via padding), the tamper
or leakage protection circuits of a chip may be disabled or weakened, a True Ran-
dom Number Generator may be biased or the IC might have a kill switch that
makes it stop functioning under certain conditions. Even in the non-malicious
case, overseas manufacturers may try to cut costs by omitting or reducing secu-
rity measures from the original design. Any single one of these manufacturing
attacks or malpractices will have serious consequences for any security appli-
cation, allow industrial espionage, privacy violations, and ﬁnally even threaten
national security.
Current methods for assuring the trustworthiness of cryptographic hardware
rely heavily on the skills of an evaluator. The lack of standardized methodologies
and tools requires that the evaluator correctly identiﬁes and manually evaluates
each risk area. The evaluator must be aware and execute all known attacks
while also formulating and exercising new forms of attack. The evaluator knows
only what was found, not what's left to be found. More resources are used
to obtain higher levels of assurance with the ultimate measure of assurance
being what happens once the product is in production or it has been deployed.
Advances in commercially viable approaches to assure the security of hardware is
critical. From deﬁning systematic approaches for assurance to identifying tools to
automate and continuously improve assurance levels, signiﬁcant new research is
required. Moreover, commercial hardware engineering practices are well behind
software engineering when it comes to establishing a set of best practices that
will yield high-quality security products. Existing methods developed for high
assurance hardware, typically for use by governments, either break down when
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considering the size of designs (e.g., microprocessors) or are unacceptable from
an economic perspective. Thus, a systematic approach with a solid scientiﬁc basis
is required to ensure that hardware as the security anchor (or root of trust) for
computing will deliver the necessary security guarantees.
2 Objectives and Goals of the Seminar
Based on the previous discussion, it is clear that there is an urgent need to design
and develop methods that increase the security and trust in current hardware
solutions. The purpose of this seminar was to bring together researchers from
academia and industry and from diﬀerent disciplines (cryptography, informa-
tion theory, theoretical and experimental physics, hardware architectures and
processor design), and allow them to investigate a whole new set of security and
cryptographic methodologies which will allow for the development of reliable and
trustworthy hardware components. Such trustworthy components will constitute
the root of trust for future generation security devices and applications.
We have identiﬁed as the main challenges to provide strong, cost-eﬀective and
easily deployable methodologies and technological means to solve the following
issues:
Exploiting inherent nano-scale physical properties (randomness) in
hardware as a new key feature for a new level of security:
 The randomness caused by inherent variations in the hardware manu-
facturing process can be exploited to uniquely identify devices. In this
context the most promising and interesting recent development based
on primitives called Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs), which are
functions embodied in a physical structure. Due to their random struc-
ture a physical stimulus/challenge generates an unpredictable response
which can be used for the purpose of device authentication. Regard-
less of their particular instantiation, the unclonability, tamper-evidence
and tamper-resistance properties of PUFs are very useful tools in anti-
counterfeiting, secure secret key storage or binding software components
to the underlying hardware.
 Investigating what sources of randomness we can exploit for this purpose,
and how to use them eﬃciently.
 Integrating components based on unique physical properties into crypto-
graphic primitives and security protocols, and investigating the security
properties achieved by such systems.
 Investigating the construction of cost-eﬀective and easy to use Reconﬁg-
urable Physically Unclonable Functions (rPUF) that can be physically
reconﬁgured.
A framework oﬀering provable security which is based on physical
properties: We aim to discuss appropriate models and methodologies to
realize and to analyze the security of resulting cryptographic primitives and
security protocols that concern the following aspects:
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 Manufacturing security: Preventing/detecting overproduction and ensur-
ing security in the commercial manufacturing environment also under
insider threats.
 Identiﬁcation and evaluation of malicious (Trojan) and unspeciﬁed func-
tionality in hardware: Ensuring the trustworthiness and full functionality
of security sensitive ICs. Recent research results indicate that new hard-
ware components are required to achieve this goal.
 Anti-Counterfeiting, veriﬁability and auditability of security critical de-
vices: Investigating hardware and system components that are needed
and economically implementable to prevent or detect counterfeited de-
vices.
 Trade-oﬀ unique device identiﬁcation versus privacy: Unique identiﬁca-
tion of objects stands clearly in contrast with privacy. In particular, in
the medical device setting, it is, on the one hand, important to uniquely
identify devices for reasons of security and safety, and on the other it is
important to provide mechanisms enabling access control to this unique
identifying information. This can include merely protecting the existence
of the device, device type, or its ID, or the conﬁdential information stored
on it or broadcasted by it.
 Dynamic and distributed Trusted Computing: Designing security mod-
ules with dynamic trusted computing functionality, i.e., a minimum root
of trust both for PC and mobile scenario where various cryptographic
functionalities can be securely generated and loaded when needed. In
particular we aim at investigating the questions such as what function-
ality does it really need to be included inside the trust boundary, how
can we verify the trusted functionality in a meaningful way and how can
we distribute trusted functionality over several ICs on the platform?
The relevance of the previously mentioned problems is only made clearer
by looking at recent developments and trends in the commercial deployment of
cryptographic hardware. Prominent examples include Intel's Trusted Execution
Technology and next generation CPUs, AMD's Presidio, and the TPM (Trusted
Platform Module) proposed by the Trusted Computing Group (TCG). Moreover,
future generations of CPUs are expected to provide a variety of cryptographic
functions, all embedded into a single chip set. Their deployment is also the
subject of large European projects such as OpenTC or TECOM.
The goals and challenges mentioned above comply with the objectives and
challenges of secure, dependable and trusted infrastructures and bridge the gap
between the current black-box security models and the real world we live in.
Given recent important advancements and developments in the area of cryp-
tographic hardware that concern many various disciplines, we expected this
Dagstuhl seminar to be an appropriate platform for experts from various disci-
plines to beneﬁt from the mutual exchange of ideas across these research commu-
nities. In addition, we hoped that the results of the discussions and interactions
during the seminar would become the corner stone in theoretical and practical
foundations for forgery-resilient cryptographic hardware.
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3 The participants
The seminar counted with the participation of 30 researchers, who are currently
working in the following countries:
Belgium(8), Canada (1), Germany (10), Great Britain (1), Israel (1),
The Netherlands (2), Poland (1), Switzerland (1) , United States (5)
These researchers brought to the seminar a rich variety of backgrounds in
computer science and engineering. These included theoretical and practical cryp-
tography, algorithms design, chip design, VLSI, low power design, system se-
curity, security evaluation, side-channel countermeasures and attacks, design of
cryptographic primitives for constrained environments, and standardization. The
diverse backgrounds created an stimulating atmosphere and allowed for inter-
esting discussions.
4 The program
The program was organized so as to combine theoretical talks describing models
to analyze the security of forgery resilient hardware with more practical ones,
which describe either the actual implementation of such hardware, its applica-
tions, or its security evaluation.
Speakers for the ﬁrst day (July 6th, 2009)
Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi (Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Germany)
Foundations for Forgery-Resilient Cryptographic Hard-
ware I
Pim Tuyls (Intrinsic-ID, The Netherlands)
Foundations for Forgery-Resilient Cryptographic Hard-
ware II
Frederik Armknecht (Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Germany)
Memory Leakage-Resilient Encryption based on Physi-
cally Unclonable Functions
Boris kori¢ (TU Eindhoven, The Netherlands)
An eﬃcient fuzzy extractor for limited noise
G. Edward Suh (Cornell University, U.S.)
Processor Hardware Authentication Leveraging Perfor-
mance Limits in Detailed Simulations and Emulations
In addition to the formal talks, there were several discussions and active
interactions among small groups of participants throughout the duration of the
seminar.
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Speakers for the second day (July 7th, 2009)
Francois-Xavier Standaert (UC Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium)
Leakage resilient cryptography in practice
Markus Kuhn (University of Cambridge, Great Britain)
GNSS signal authentication methods
Stefan Katzenbeisser (TU Darmstadt, Germany)
PUF-Based Authentication Protocols, Revisited
Boris kori¢ (TU Eindhoven, The Netherlands)
Simpliﬁcation of Controlled PUF primitives
Berk Sunar (Worcester Polytechnic Institute, U.S.)
Fingerprints from Optical Discs
Darko Kirovski (Microsoft Research - Redmond, US)
Anti-Counterfeiting: Mixing the Physical and the Digital
World
Adi Shamir (Weizmann Institute, Israel)
Trapdoors in Cryptographic Hardware
Jorge Guajardo (Philips Research Eindhoven, The Netherlands)
Medical Applications of PUFs and Other Thoughts on
PUFs
Speakers for the third day (July 8th, 2009)
Jean-Pierre Seifert (TU Berlin & Deutsche Telekom Labs, Germany)
Forgery-resilient Circuit Encoding
Lejla Batina (KU Leuven, Belgium)
Security Challenges for RFID Systems
Patrick Schaumont (Virginia Polytechnic Institute - Blacksburg, U.S.)
Engineering On-Chip Thermal Eﬀects
Philippe Teuwen (NXP Semiconductors - Leuven, Belgium)
How to Make Smartcards Resistant to Hackers'
Lightsabers?
Christian Wachsmann (Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Germany)
Enhancing RFID Security and Privacy by Physically Un-
clonable Functions
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5 Concluding Remarks
We found the seminar to be fruitful in the sense that several modeling issues
were raised, which we expect will lead the community to understand better the
security issues and requirements of forgery resilient hardware. In addition, the
participation of both, theoretical computer scientists and more implementation
oriented scientists, allowed for a better understanding from both sides: what
models are realistic, what needs to be formalized to be able to prove security
of an implementation, and what emerging applications of security hardware exist.
Moreover, it appears that the formal modelings of hardware primitives and the
subsequent deployment of such hardware will remain hot topics for the next few
years. In the future, we plan further workshops to encourage continued interdis-
ciplinary interactions.
The organizers:
Jorge Guajardo
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